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Total-Sales Royalties Under the Patent-Misuse Doctrine: A 
Critique of Zenith 
Acting on the specific authority of the United States Constitution, 
Congress grants to inventors, for a limited time, an exclusive right to 
their inventions. 1 This patent grant carries out a public policy "to 
promote the Progress of Science and useful Arts."2 The courts will 
prohibit a patentee from extending its limited monopoly in ways 
which undermine this patent policy.3 Under the patent-misuse doc-
trine, for example, the courts deny infringement relief to a patentee 
who has abused the patent privilege.4 
This Note considers whether one kind of patent-licensing pro-
vision-a total-sales royalty-should constitute patent misuse.5 A 
total-sales royalty provision calls for royalties based upon the licen-
see's total sales of a product. Unlike licensing provisions based 
solely on patent use, a total-sales royalty obligates the licensee to pay 
1. See U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 8. The present patent law is codified in Title 35 of the 
U.S. Code and states in part: "Every patent shall contain ... a grant to the patentee, his heirs 
or assigns, for the term of seventeen years . . . of the right to exclude others from making, 
using, or selling the invention throughout the United States .... " 35 U.S.C. § 154 (1970). 
2. Morton Salt Co. v. G.S. Suppiger Co., 314 U.S. 488, 492 (1942) (quoting U.S. CONST. 
art. I, § 8, cl. 8). 
3. See, e.g., B.B. Chern. Co. v. Ellis, 314 U.S. 495 (1942); Morton Salt Co. v. G.S. Suppiger 
Co., 314 U.S. 488 (1942); Leitch Mfg. Co. v. Barber Co., 302 U.S. 458 (1938); Carbice Corp. of 
America v. American Patents Dev. Corp., 283 U.S. 27 (1931); Motion Picture Patents Co. v. 
Universal Film Mfg. Co., 243 U.S. 502 (1917). 
4. See, e.g., Morton Salt Co. v. G.S. Suppiger Co., 314 U.S. 488 (1942). 
5. The methods of charging for the privilege of using a patent are highly varied. Many of 
these licensing provisions have been successfully challenged as constituting patent misuse, 
These include (I) "tie-in" arrangements whereby the sale ofunpatented materials is "tied" to 
the sale or license of the patented invention, see, e.g., Morton Salt Co. v. G.S. Suppiger, 314 
U.S. 488 (1942), discussed in text at notes 21-25 infra; (2) requirements that the licensee abstain 
from producing products which compete with the licensed product, see, e.g., National 
Lockwasher v. George K. Garrett Co., 137 F.2d 255 (3d Cir. 1943), discussed in note 26 i,!fra; 
(3) price-fixing agreements, see, e.g., United States v. Line Material Co., 333 U.S. 287 (1948); 
see Note, 29 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 782 (1961); see also Gibbons, Price Fixing in Patent Licenses 
and the Antitrust Laws, 51 VA. L. REV. 273 (1965); (4) discriminatory royalty rates, see, e.g., 
Laitram Corp. v. King Crab, Inc., 244 F. Supp. 9 (D. Alas. 1965), discussed in Note, The Misuse 
.Doctrine and Post Expiration-.Discriminatory--and Exorbitant Patent Royalties, 43 IND, L.J. 
106, 116-26 (1967); (5) exorbitant royalty rates, see, e.g., American Photocopy Equip. Co, v. 
Rovico, Inc., 257 F. Supp. 192 (N.D. Ill. 1966), ajfd., 384 F.2d 813 (7th Cir. 1967); see Note, 
Regulation of Patent License Royalty Rates Under the Antitrust Laws, 65 MICH. L. REV. 1631 
(1967); (6) mandatory package licenses, see, e.g., American Securit Co. v. Shatterproof Glass 
Corp., 268 F.2d 769 (3d Cir.), cert. denied, 361 U.S. 902 (1959), discussed in note 69 infra; and 
(7) post-expiration royalties, see, e.g., Brulotte v. Thys Co., 379 U.S. 29 (1964); see Comment, 
Validity of Patent License Provisions Requiring Payment of Post Expiration Royalties, 65 
COLUM. L. REV. 1256 (1965); 1965 U. ILL. L.F. 325. 
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royalties on the sale of each end product6 covered by the royalty 
even though the end product does not embody or use the licensed 
patent.7 The United States Supreme Court held in Zenith Radio 
Cop. v. Hazeltine Research, Inc. ,8 that, " ... conditioning the grant 
6. In this Note, "end product" refers to the actual product unit sold by the licensee. "Prod-
uct" includes the class of end products covered by the royalty. Thus, if the licensee manufac-
tures contact lenses and agrees to pay royalties on the sale of each lens, the contact lenses are 
the product covered by the total-sales royalty. The total-sales royalty means that the licensee 
must pay royalties on the sale of each lens (the end product), even if the individual lens does 
not use the licensed patent. (If there are different classes of end products, such as "hard" and 
"soft" lenses, these will be referred to as market segments. See text at note 131 i,ifra.) 
In a recent survey, 64% of the respondents reported that royalties are "always" or "usually" 
based on a percentage of the licensee's sales. Fifteen percent of the respondents "always" or 
"usually" used a fixed sum per unit of sale or production. While the survey investigated the 
use of royalties payable upon the sale of end products, it did not distinguish between total-
sales royalties and royalties payable only on the sale of end products which use the licensed 
patent. See Oppenheim & Scott, Empirical Study of Limitations in Domestic Patent and Know-
How Licensing:.A Preliminary Report, 14 IDEA 193 (1970); Oppenheim & Scott, Empirical 
Study of Limitations in Domestic Pale/JI and Know-How Licensing: A Second Report, 14 IDEA 
123 (Conference Issue 1970). 
7. A further feature of total-sales royalties is that total royalties increase as each end prod-
uct is sold. Total-sales royalties, moreover, may be divided into two types. Under a "percent-
age" total-sales royalty provision, the licensee must pay a percentage of its total dollar sales of 
the covered product, while under the "flat-rate" total-sales royalty, the licensee must pay a 






sales price per unit of product sold 
total quantity produced and sold in units 
percentage rate applied to dollar sales 
flat rate in dollars applied to each unit sold 
Total dollar sales= S • Q. 
Thus, under a "percentage" total-sales royalty, the total royalty payment will equal 
Rp • (S • Q), while the royalty per unit will equal Rp • ~ • Q or Rp • S. This means that total 
royalties will increase with each unit sold by the amount of Rp • S. Moreover, the royalty per 
unit will vary with tile sales price per unit product. 
In contrast, under a "flat-rate" total-sales royalty provision, total royalties will amount to 
Rf • Q. Although total royalties will increase with each unit sold, total royalties will not vary 
with the sales price. 
An example of the "percentage" total-sales royalty provision may be found in Mutchnik v. 
M.S. Willett, Inc., 274 Md. 610, 611-12, 337 A.2d 72, 73 (1975), discussed in text at notes 90-94 
i,yra. The license agreement specified that Willett would: 
(b) ... pay Licensors (the Mutchniks) ... a royalty of five percent (5%) of the highest 
gross invoiced prices charged by Licensee (Willett) and/or its sublicensees for such [metal 
table] slides .... In the event Licensee and/or any of its sublicensees shall manefacture 
and/or sell any other slides, such royalty shall also apply ,to and be payable on the same 
basis, on the manz!facture and/ or sale of such other slides. . 
274 Md. at 611-12, 337 A.2d at 73 (emphasis original). 
An example of the "flat-rate" total-sales royalty provision may be found in Glen Mfg. Inc. 
v. Perfect Fit Indus., Inc., 420 F.2d 319, 320 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 397 U.S. 1042 (1970), 
discussed in text at notes 95-99 i,ifra. The license agreement provided that 
(4) Perfect Fit and C. & H. agree to pay to Glen a royalty often (10) cents on each toilet 
tank cover made or sold by Perfect Fit or C. & H. after the date of this agreement, for 
the full term hereof, provided, however, that only one payment of royalty will be made by 
Perfect Fit or C. & H. on any single toilet tank cover sold under this agreement. 
8. 395 U.S. 100 (1969); see text at notes 43-84 infra. 
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of a patent license upon payment of royalties on products which do 
not use the teaching of the patent does amount to patent misuse."9 
Under this "conditioning" test, a total-sales royalty provision consti-
tutes patent misuse when "the patentee refuses to license on any 
other basis and leaves the licensee with the choice between a license 
so providing and no license at all." 10 The Court further character-
ized conditioning as the patentee's use of the patent power "to insist 
on a total-sales royalty and to override the protestations of the licen-
see."11 Thus, the Zenith conditioning test permits total-sales royal-
ties where the provision is implemented for the convenience of the 
parties12 or where the licensee fails to protest such a royalty. 13 
This Note criticizes the Supreme Court's treatment of total-sales 
royalties. Part I outlines the scope of the patent-misuse doctrine, and 
Part II describes the development of the Zenith conditioning test. 
Part III analyzes that test; it suggests that the Zenith opinion is not 
internally consistent and that courts may not be able to apply the 
conditioning test satisfactorily. Finally, in response to Justice 
Harlan's dissenting opinion in Zenith, in which he notes the dearth 
of literature on the economic consequences of total-sales royalty pro-
visions,14 Part III undertakes an analysis of those consequences. The 
analysis demonstrates that total-sales royalty provisions undermine 
the purposes of the patent-misuse doctrine by discouraging inventive 
activity and by deterring the licensee from entering new markets. In 
short, it will be suggested that all total-sales royalty provisions, re-
gardless of conditioning, should be condemned as patent misuse. 
I. HISTORY OF THE PATENT-MISUSE DOCTRINE 
The judicially created patent-misuse doctrine arose out of the at-
tempts of patentees to enlarge the scope of their patent monopolies 
by "tying" the sale of unpatented materials to the sale or license of 
their patented inventions. 15 Although it had previously approved ty-
ing, 16 the Supreme Court overruled its approval in Motion Picture 
9. 395 U.S. at 135. 
10. 395 U.S. at 135. 
11. 395 U.S. at 138. 
12. 395 U.S. at 138. 
13. 395 U.S. at 139. 
14. 395 U.S. at 145. 
15. For a general discussion of the history of the patent-misuse doctrine, see Nicoson, Mis• 
use of the Misuse IJoctrine in Iefringement Suits, 9 U.C.L.A. L. REV. 76 (1962). See generally 
cases cited in note 3 supra. 
16. See Henry v. A.B. Dick Co., 224 U.S. I (1912); Heaton-Peninsular Button-Fastener 
Co. v. Eureka Specialty Co., 77 F. 288 (6th Cir. 1896). 
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Patents Co. v. Universal Film Manefacturing Co. 17 In that case, the 
assignee of a patent had licensed the patented machine on the condi-
tion that the licensee notify purchasers that they must purchase un-
patented supplies from the licensor. 18 The Court rejected the 
assignee's claim that the licensee had infringed the patent by violat-
ing this condition. The Court reasoned that the rights of a patentee 
are restricted to those expressly granted by the patent19 and a provi-
sion which restricted the buying or selling of unpatented goods ex-
tended the patent monopoly to products beyond the scope of the 
patent and thereby undermined the policy of a limited patent 
grant.20 
In Morton Salt Co. v. G.S. Suppiger Co.,21 the Court further ex-
tended the patent-misuse doctrine by allowing it as a defense against 
a claim of direct infringement. Unlike the plaintiff in Motion 
Picture, who alleged that the licensee had violated the tie-:-in condi-
tion,22 the patentee in Morton Salt alleged that the defendant, by 
leasing machines within the plaintiff's patent, was liable for patent 
infringement.23 The Court rejected this claim on the ground that the 
patentee had misused its patent by licensing it on the condition that 
the licensee purchase unpatented supplies for the patented product.24 
17. 243 U.S. 502 (1917). 
18. The plaintiff was the assignee of a patent on a mechanism which accurately and uni-
formly fed film through a motion picture projector. The plaintiff required its licensee, a manu-
facturer of projectors, to attach to all its projectors a notice that restricted the use of the 
projectors to films specified by the plaintiff. 
19. In overruling Heaton-Peninsular Button-Fastener Co. v. Eureka -Specialty Co., 77 F. 
288 (6th Cir. 1896), the Court rejected the argument that since the patentee may withhold the 
patent from public use, the patentee must logically and necessarily be permitted to impose any 
conditions on the patent's use. 243 U.S. at 514. The Court held that the patentee could not 
restrict the buyer's use of the patented machine and asserted that that holding did not deprive 
"the inventor [of] the exclusive use of just what his inventive genius has discovered." 243 U.S. 
at 513. 
20. Although the Court acknowledged that one purpose of the patent laws is to reward 
inventors by giving them an exclusive right to their inventions for a limited period, the Court 
also noted that the primary purpose of the patent laws is not the creation of private fortunes, 
but is rather "to promote the progress of science and the useful arts." 243 U.S. at 5 I I. Accord-
ingly, the Court held that the patent grant is designed to provide only a reasonable reward to 
inventors and that "the only effect of[a] patent is to restrain others from manufacturing, using, 
or selling" that which has been invented. 243 U.S. at 510. 
21. 314 U.S. 488 (1942). 
22. 243 U.S. 502 (1917). As it did in Motion Picture, the Court has frequently said that the 
violation of an illegal tie-in condition by a licensee does not create an infringement cause of 
action. See, e.g., Leitch Mfg. Co. v. Barber Co., 302 U.S. 458 (1938); Carbice Corp. of 
America v. American Patents Dev. Corp., 283 U.S. 27 (1931). 
23. The patentee sought damages for infringement as well as an injunction preventing the 
licensee from leasing the infringing machines. 314 U.S. at 489. 
24. Specifically, the patentee had licensed a patented salt-tablet canning machine on the 
condition that the licensee purchase the salt tablets from the patentee's wholly owned subsidi-
ary. 
The Court denied relief even though the defendant had not made a licensing agreement 
with the patentee nor agreed to the tie-in provision. The Court reasoned, "It is the adverse 
1148 Michigan Law Review [Vol. 76:1144 
The tie-in provision, the Court said, was an attempt by the patentee 
to extend its monopoly beyond what the patent policy permitted.25 
Although both Motion Picture and Morton Salt explicitly relied 
on the patent policy, the patent-misuse doctrine also rests on anti-
trust concepts.26 Language in the Morton Saft opinion, for example, 
indicated that the Court feared that the patentee's tie-in arrangement 
restrained competition in the sale of the unpatented article.27 The 
Court cautioned, however, that it was unnecessary to decide whether 
the plaintiff had violated the antitrust laws. Although this implies 
that a :finding of patent misuse does not require a :finding of an anti-
trust violation,28 antitrust notions have had a strong influence on the 
effect upon the public interest of a successful infringement suit in conjunction with the paten-
tee's course of conduct which disqualifies him to maintain the suit, regardless of whether the 
particular defendant has suffered from the misuse of the patent." 314 U.S. at 494. 
25. 314 U.S. at 494. According to the Court, although the "patent monopoly carries out a 
public policy adopted by the Constitution and laws of the United States, 'to promote the Pro-
gress of Science and useful Arts, by securing for limited Times to ... Inventors the exclusive 
Right ... ' to their 'new and useful' inventions," the monopoly covers nothing "that is not 
embraced in the invention." 314 U.S. at 492. 
The Court noted that relief would be permitted when the improper practice had been aban-
doned and the misuse had been dissipated. Dissipation of a misuse can occur before, during, 
or after trial. See DeLong v. Lemco Hosiery Mills, Inc., 223 F. Supp. 1001, 1009 (M.D.N.C. 
1963). See generally Nordhaus, Antitrust Laws and Public Policy in Relation to Patents, 3 DUQ, 
L. REV. I, 17-22 (1964); Comment, Dissipation of Patent Misuse, 1968 Wis. L. REV, 918. 
26. See Mercoid Corp. v. Minneapolis-Honeywell Regulator Co., 320 U.S. 680 (1944), dis-
cussed in note 32 iefra; National Lockwasher v. George K. Garrett Co., 137 F.2d 255 (3d Cir. 
1943). The influence of antitrust notions on the patent policy developed despite earlier cases 
which had indicated that an antitrust defense was irrelevant to a patent infringement suit. See 
Brown Saddle Co. v. Troxel, 98 F. 620 (C.C.N.D. Ohio 1899); Strait v. National Harrow, 51 F. 
819 (C.C.N.D. N.Y. 1892). Those cases were cited as late as 1941. See Wisconsin Aluminum 
Research Foundation v. Vitamin Technologists, Inc., 41 F. Supp. 857, 867 (S.D. Cal. 1941), 
National Lockwasher nicely illustrates the influence of antitrust policy on the patent-misuse 
doctrine. In that case, the patentee licensed the manufacture of a nontangling spring washer. · 
The patentee's standard license agreement provided that the licensee would not manufacture 
any nontangling spring washer that did not use the licensed patent. The court directed dismis-
sal of the infringement complaint because the patentee had used its patent monopoly to sup-
press the manufacture and sale of competing unpatented articles. The patentee, according to 
the court, had attempted "by means other than that of free competition to extend the bounds 
of its lawful monopoly to make, use, and vend the patented device to the extent where such 
device would be the only one available to a user of such an article." 137 F.2d at 256. Thus, the 
court's opinion suggests that the suppression of competition is a legitimate concern of the mis-
use doctrine. 
27. The Court noted that the issue was ''whether a court of equity will lend its aid to 
protect the patent monopoly when the respondent is using it as the effective means of re-
straining competition with its sale ofan unpatented article." 314 U.S. at 490 (emphasis added), 
The Court concluded the patentee who thus restrains competition cannot receive such aid. 314 
U.S. at 491. 
28. Accord, Transparent-Wrap Mach. Corp. v. Stokes & Smith Co., 329 U.S. 637, 641 
(I 947) ("though control of the unpatented article or device falls short of a prohibited restraint 
of trade or monopoly, it will not be sanctioned"). q. Zenith Radio Corp. v. Hazeltine Re-
search, Inc., 395 U.S. 100, 140 (1969) ("if there was such patent misuse, it does not necessarily 
follow that the misuse embodies the ingredients of a violation of either Section I or Section 2 
of the Sherman Act"). 
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patent-misuse doctrine. This can be seen in the Court's implication, 
in a later case, that conduct offensive to the antitrust laws is, per se, 
patent misuse.29 Similarly, other courts have, by basing their misuse 
decisions almost exclusively on competitive considerations, ne-
glected the policy of the patent grant.30 In still other cases the al-
leged infringer could choose whether to base its misuse defense upon 
either patent or antitrust policy.31 
Since the patent-misuse doctrine rests on both antitrust and pat-
ent law,32 we will examine the legality of total-sales royalties in light 
of both policies. This Note argues that both policies are frustrated 
by this kind of royalty provision. 
JI. THE DEVELOPMENT OF THE CONDITIONING TEST 
This Note now moves to its discussion of the patent-misuse doc-
trine as it has been applied to total-sales royalties. The Supreme 
Court first assessed the validity of total-sales royalties in Automatic 
29. See United States Gypsum Co. v. National Gypsum Co., 352 U.S. 457 (1957). Na-
tional Gypsum, on the ground that United States Gypsum had been convicted of antitrust 
violations, refused to pay royalties until a licensing agreement which had no price-fixing provi-
sions was reached. When United States Gypsum sued to recover royalties due under the ex-
isting license agreement, National Gypsum argued that United States Gypsum "was barred 
from recovery by reason of unpurged misuse of the patents involved .... " 352 U.S. at 462. 
The Court remanded the case to the disttjct court for evidence on the patent-misuse issue. The 
Court noted that "the only patent misuse that has ever been established in this long-drawn-out 
litigation is concerted price fixing under the former patent licenses ... " and reasoned that 
United States Gypsum could not recover if the misuse found in the antitrust litigation re-
mained unpurged. 352 U.S. at 472-73. That reasoning suggests that the Court considered 
United States Gypsum's prior Sherman Act violation to be patent misuse. 
30. See, e.g., Automatic Radio Mfg. Co. v. Hazeltine Research, Inc., 339 U.S. 827 (1950), 
discussed in text at notes 33-42 i'!fra. The Court's failure to consider patent policy is noted in 
Justice Douglas' dissenL 339 U.S. at 836. 
31. See, e.g., Speny Prods., Inc. v. Aluminum Co. of America, 171 F. Supp. 901 (E.D. 
, Ohio 1959), o/fd in part and revd in part, 285 F.2d 911 (6th Cir. 1960). 
32. In Mercoid Corp. v. Minneapolis-Honeywell Regulator Co., 320 U.S. 680 (1944), for 
example, the opinion seems grounded in both antitrust and patent policy. The Court wrote, 
"The legality of any attempt to bring unpatented goods within the protection of the patent is 
measured by the anti-trust laws not by the patent law." 320 U.S. at 684. The Court, however, 
must not have intended to abandon the patent-policy basis for misuse, since it also invoked 
that policy when withholding equitable relief from the patentee. 320 U.S. at 684. See 
generally Wood, The Tangle of Mercoid Case Implications, l3 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 61, 79-81 
(1944). 
The misuse doctrine has often been criticized. One commentator has proposed that misuse 
should remain a defense in patent-infringement actions only where the conduct of the patentee 
either is or is intended to be anticompetitive. Wallace, Proper Use of the Patent Misuse 
J)octrine, 26 MERCER L. REV. 813 (1975). For a further discussion of this notion, see Marquis, 
Limitations on Patent License Restrictions: Some Observations, 58 IOWA L. REV. 41 (1972). 
Still another commentator would enact legislation to ensure that the courts scrutinize patent-
licensing provisions under the rule of reason. Comment, The Patent-Antitrnst Balance: Propos-
als far Change, 17 VILL. L. REV. 463 (1972). For a general analysis of the most recent congres-
sional activity in the area of patent-license provisions, see Bowes, Patent Law Reform and the 
Expansion of Provisions Relating to Licensing, 8 LOY. CHI. L.J. 279 (1977). 
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Radio Manufacturing Co. v. Hazeltine Research, Jnc. 33 Automatic 
Radio, a manufacturer of radio-broadcasting receivers, had entered 
into a licensing agreement which entitled it to use, in the manufac-
ture of its "home products," any or all of the 570 patents which were 
held by Hazeltine or might be acquired by it. In exchange for the 
license, Automatic agreed to pay a small percentage of the selling 
price of its complete radio-broadcasting receivers.34 Under this 
agreement, Automatic was not obliged to use any of the licensed pat-
ents but was required to pay royalties whether or not they were used. 
Hazeltine sued to recover royalties due under the agreement, and 
Automatic defended by arguing that the total-sales royalty provision 
constituted patent misuse. 
The Supreme Court, in affirming the decision of the court of ap-
peals, held that a total-sales royalty provision, even among related 
businesses, was not a per se misuse of patents.35 The Court distin-
guished total-sales royalty provisions from the previously prohibited 
tie-in provisions, thereby rejecting the licensee's claim that a total-
sales royalty provision "ties" the payment of royalties on unpatented 
goods to the grant of a license. According to the Court, a tie-in pro-
vision extends "the monopoly of the patent to create another monop-
oly or restraint of competition,"36 while a total-sales royalty 
provision does not restrain competition beyond the legitimate grant 
of the patent. Although the Court noted that convenience alone 
33. 339 U.S. 827 (1950). An earlier case, United States v. United States Gypsum Co., 333 
U.S. 364 (1948), involved a licensing agreement whereby the licensee paid a stipulated percent• 
age of the selling price of "all plaster board and gypsum wall board of every kind" whether or 
not made by patented processes or embodying patented inventions. 333 U.S. at 381. The 
Court, however, decided the case on other grounds and held that the patentee had restrained 
trade in violation of the Sherman Act by fixing prices of patented gypsum board and by elimi-
nating production of unpatented board. The Court was influenced by the presence of the 
percentage total-sales royalty provision: "Patents grant no privilege to their owners of organiz-
ing the.use of those patents to monopolize an industry through price control, lhroug/1 royalties 
for the patents drawn .from paten/free industry products and through regulation of distribution." 
333 U.S. at 400 (emphasis added). The opinion, however, did not directly ask whether the 
provision, standing alone, constituted patent misuse. That is, the Court considered the total-
sales royalty provision in the context of a Sherman Act violation, not in the context of a licen• 
see's defense to a patentee's infringement or breach-of-contract suit. 
34. 339 U.S. at 829. 
35. 339 U.S. at 834. The district court had sustained the validity of the licensing agree-
ment, had entered judgment for an accounting and recovery of royalties, and had enjoined the 
licensee from failing to pay royalties, keep records, and render reports during the life of the 
agreement .. 77 F. Supp. 493 (D. Mass. 1948). The court of appeals affirmed. 176 F.2d 799 (1st 
Cir. 1949). 
36. 339 U.S. at 832. As examples of tie-in provisions, the Court cited those instances where 
the patentee licenses its patent on the condition that the licensee either (1) purchase an unpat-
ented good, (2) promise not to produce or sell a competing good, or (3) accept the license of 
another patent. 339 U.S. at 830-31. 
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could not justify the unlawful extension of the patent monopoly,37 
the Court also invoked, in part, the reasoning of the lower courts that 
the royalty provision was a convenient and legitimate method of cal-
culating royalties. The district court, for example, noted that a total-
sales royalty makes it unnecessary for firms to determine the extent 
to which the licensee's products embody one of the licensed pat-
ents. 38 
Automatic Radio is also significant because the Court upheld the 
validity of total-sales royalty provisions without expressly consider-
ing the purposes and policies of the patent grant. 39 Indeed, the 
Court's opinion suggests that misuse will be found only when the 
patentee's conduct has anticompetitive effects.40 In dissent, Justice 
Douglas criticized this failure of the Court to remember that "the 
power of Congress to grant patents is circumscribed by the Constitu-
tion."41 Justice Douglas recognized that a total-sales royalty provi-
sion, like a tie-in provision, may compensate the patentee for 
unpatented products. He wrote: "[T]he patent owner has therefore 
used the patents to bludgeon his way into a partnership with this 
licensee, collecting royalties on unpatented as well as patented arti-
cles. . . . A plainer extension of a patent by unlawful means would 
be hard to imagine."42 Although Justice Douglas was correct in crit-
icizing total-sales royalties on "patent policy" grounds, the most tell-
ing criticism of a total-sales royalty rests not on the fact that it 
compensates the patentee for unpatented products, but on its unde-
sirable economic consequences. This criticism will be elaborated 
upon below. 
The Supreme Court did not again rule on the validity of total-
sales royalty provisions until Zenith Radio Corp. v. Hazeltine Re-
search, Inc. 43 As in Automatic Radio, the dispute involved a stan-
dard Hazeltine license for all Hazeltine's domestic radio and 
television patents; it called for a royalty of a percentage of the licen-
37. 339 U.S. at 834. 
38. 339 U.S. at 833. The court of appeals affirmed the decision of the lower court on the 
ground that, because it would not be unlawful to pay a fixed royalty, it was permissible to pay 
a variable consideration measured by a percentage of the licensee's sales. 
39. For this policy, see notes 20 & 25 supra and accompanying text. 
40. This can be seen in the Court's definition of patent misuse as "an extension of the 
monopoly of the patent to create another monopoly or restraint of competition." 339 U.S. at 
832 (emphasis added). Indeed, the Court concluded that the total-sales royalty "does not cre-
ate another monopoly; it creates no restraint of competition beyond the legitimate grant of the 
patent." 339 U.S. at 833. 
41. 339 U.S. at 836. 
42. 339 U.S. at 838. 
43. 395 U.S. 100 (1969). 
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see's sales of radios and televisions.44 When the license agreement 
expired, the licensee (Zenith), asserting that it no longer required a 
license, refused to renew it. Hazeltine brought a patent-infringement 
suit, and Zenith responded that the patent was invalid.45 As part of 
its defense and as part of a later counterclaim for treble damages and 
injunctive relief, Zenith contended that Hazeltine had misused its 
patents.46 
The district court addressed the infringement issue first and held 
the patent invalid. On the misuse counterclaim, the court held that 
Hazeltine had misused its domestic patents by coercing Zenith to 
accept a five-year package license47 and by insisting on royalties for 
unpatented products.48 The court enjoined the patentee from "con-
ditioning" the grant of a license upon the licensee's payment of roy-
alties on the sale of products "not covered by the_ patent."49 The 
court of appeals agreed that the patent was invalid, but on the mis-
use counterclaim it concluded that conditioning the grant of a license 
upon the payment of royalties on the sale of products which made no 
use of the patent was not patent misuse. Accordingly, the court re-
versed this portion of the district court's injunction.50 
44. The district court described Hazeltine's licensing policy as follows: 
Plaintiff's policy ... was to grant a so-called standard package license which conferred 
on the licensees for a five-year period freedom from any charge of infringement under all 
present as well as future Hazeltine patents issuing during the term of the agreement. Roy-
alties were required to be paid on the licensee's entire production whether its products em-
ployed any or none of the Hazeltine patents. The license was in effect a covenant not to sue 
the licensee or its customers should Hazeltine decide within the license period that the 
manufacture and sale of any particular apparatus infringed upon any of its patent rights. 
239 F. Supp. 51, 69-70 (1965) (emphasis added). 
45. 239 F. Supp. at 54. 
46. 239 F. Supp. at 69. Zenith also sought treble damages and injunctive relief for Hazel-
tine's alleged conspiracy with foreign patent pools. Zenith contended that the patent pools had 
refused to license to Zenith those patents, including Hazeltine's, which had been placed within 
their exclusive licensing authority. The district court found that Hazeltine had conspired with 
the pools in violation of the antitrust laws and awarded Zenith an injunction and treble dam• 
ages of nearly $35,000,000. The court of appeals reversed this judgment on the ground that 
Zenith had failed to show actual injury. 388 F.2d 25 (7th Cir. 1967). The Court reversed in 
part, holding that, for some of the patent pools, Zenith had met its burden of showing injury. 
This portion of the case is considered in 395 U.S. at 113-33. 
47. For a discussion of package license provisions, see text at notes 69-70 iefra. 
48. See 239 F. Supp. at 68-72, 77. The court enjoined Hazeltine from engaging in further 
misuse and awarded Zenith $150,000 in treble damages. See note 49 iefra. 
49. The injunction is printed, in part, in 395 U.S. at 133-34. It prohibited Hazeltine from 
"'[c]onditioning directly or indirectly the grant of a license to ... Zenith ... upon the taking 
of a license under any other patent or upon the paying of royalties on t/1e manefacture, use or sale 
of apparatus not covered by such patent.'" 395 U.S. at 133-34 (emphasis original). 
50. The court of appeals achieved this by deleting the last clause of the injunction. See 
note 49 supra. It should be noted that the court of appeals' resolution of the total-sales royalty 
issue did not lead it to reverse the district court's award of treble damages. Instead, the court 
affirmed the treble damage award because Hazeltine's coercive attempts to induce a package-
licensing agreement constituted misuse. 
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The Supreme Court reversed, holding that "conditioning the 
grant of a license upon payment of royalties on products which do 
not use the teaching of the patent does amount to patent misuse."51 
The Court carefully pointed out that the parties could, for purposes 
of mutual convenience, use a total-sales royalty provision.52 The 
Court's rule only prohibited "conditioning" a license upon the pay-
ment of royalties on unpatented products, "that is, where the paten-
tee refuses to license on any other basis and leaves the licensee with 
the choice between a license so providing and no license at all."53 
Indeed, the Court noted that a licensee "may insist upon paying only 
for use, and not on the basis of total sales."54 
This conditioning test permitted the Court to distinguish rather 
than overrule Automatic Radio. According fo the Court, Automatic 
Radio was not inconsistent with the district court's injunction 
against conditioning a license upon the payment of royalties on un-
patented products.55 Automatic Radio, wrote the Court, did not dis-
cuss the negotiations leading up to the adoption of the royalty 
formula and thus did not rely on a finding that the patentee had used 
its patent leverage to coerce a total-sales royalty provision. Thus the 
Court concluded that Automatic Radio did not authorize the paten-
tee to override the protestations of the licensee. 56 
Justice Harlan dissented from the majority's treatment of patent 
misuse, and described it as holding that a "patent license provision 
which measures royalties by a percentage of total sales is lawful if 
included for the 'convenience' of both parties but unlawful if 'in-
51. 395 U.S. at 135. Since the district court's treble damage award for patent misuse was 
affirmed by the court of appeals, the Supreme Court only discussed whether the court of ap-
peals was correct in striking the last clause of the injunction. 395 U.S. at 133. 
52. 395 U.S. at 138. It is often more convenient to base royalties on the sale of products, 
regardless of whether the product uses the teaching of the patent. See note 38 supra and 
accompanying text. See also text at note 106 i,!fra. 
53. 395 U.S. at 135. For a further definition of conditioning, see text at note 11 supra. 
54. 395 U.S. at 139. 
55. 395 U.S. at 138. 
56. Its conclusion that the legality of a total-sales royalty provision should be determined 
by a conditioning test did not lead the Court to affirm the injunction. First, the Court re-
manded the case to the trial court for a determination of whether Hazeltine had "conditioned" 
its license upon the inclusion of this provision. Second, the Court held that a finding of patent 
misuse would not necessarily establish a Clayton Act violation. That Jiolding settled a long-
debated question. According to the Court, patent misuse does not, in itself, violate the anti-
trust laws and, before an injunction can be granted, the ingredients of an antitrust violation 
must be established. Nonetheless, a showing of misuse is a defense for the licensee and pre-
cludes any injunction against infringement by the licensee. The holding that patent misuse 
does not necessarily violate the antitrust laws implies that the competitive restraints that con-
stitute patent misuse are not as extensive as those constituting a violation of the antitrust laws. 
See note 28 supra and accompanying text. 
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sisted upon' by the patentee."57 Justice Harlan predicted that diffi-
culties in applying the conditioning test would produce undesirable 
uncertainty in this area of business. The test, according to Justice 
Harlan, would force courts to evaluate negotiations artfully embel-
lished by wary patentees and would give little assurance to the par-
ties that their agreements would be enforced. Justice Harlan also 
contended that the majority had, in effect, overruled Automatic 
Radio. He read Automatic Radio as holding that total-sales royalty 
agreements do not constitute misuse, even if they were insisted upon 
by the patentee. The majority opinion, J1,1stice Harlan insisted, 
found misuse in a patent license of "precisely the same tenor" as that 
upheld in Automatic Radio and did so "without offering more than a 
shadow of a reason in law or economics for departing from that ear-
lier ruling."58 He saw no reason why this method of calculating the 
amount of royalties should be any less permissible than other alter-
natives, whether or not it is "insisted upon" by the patentee.59 
Justice Harlan concluded by attempting to show that the condi-
tioning test failed to achieve any of its possible purposes. He argued 
that if the Court intended to protect licensees against overreaching, it 
failed to explain why licensees as a class need this protection60 or 
why royalties based solely upon use could not be equally overreach-
ing. If the Court thought that total-sales royalties discouraged the 
licensee from "inventing around" the patent or acquiring substitutes, 
Justice Harlan argued that these effects would be present even if the 
parties freely bargained for the provision. 61 According to Justice 
Harlan, the Court did not address the critical issue: whether total-
sales royalties without exception constitute patent misuse.62 He con-
sidered but rejected as insufficient the argument that percentage-of-
sales royalty provisions are economically undesirable.63 Given the 
57. 395 U.S. at 141. 
58. 395 U.S. at 142. 
59. Other alternatives would include the payment of a fixed sum to acquire a license for a 
given period of time and the use of royalties based upon the sale of items which use the pat-
ent's teaching. 
60. One commentator has asserted, "As a class patent licensees are unlikely candidates for 
'ward of the court' status, and the cases that rest on the premise of overreaching are likely to be 
unsound, either in their reasoning or in both reasoning and result." Baxter, Legal Reslriclions 
on Exploitation efthe Paten/ Monopoly: An Economic Analysis, 76 YALE L.J. 267, 278 (1966) 
(footnotes omitted). 
61. In a later part of this Note, this argument will be made and supported. See text at Part 
III.C infra. 
62. 395 U.S. at 142. 
63. Baxter, supra note 60, condemned all royalties based on the sale of end products. See 
note 6 supra. That is, he condemned not only total-sales royalties, but also those royalties 
based on the sale of end products which use the patent. This Note argues more modestly that 
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choice between holding total-sales royalty provisions valid or in-
valid, Justice Harlan asserted that he would adhere to the rule of 
Automatic Radio and uphold all total-sales royalty provisions. 
This Note will argue that while many of Justice Harlan's criti-
cisms of the Zenith test are well taken, his conclusion that all total-
sales royalty provisions should be upheld is unwise. Because of their 
undesirable economic consequences, all total-sales royalty provisions 
should be condemned as patent misuse. 
III. CRITICISMS OF THE ZENITH DECISION 
Three specific criticisms of the Zenith conditioning test can be 
made. First, the Court failed to explain adequately its reasoning. 
Second, applying the Zenith test properly may be difficult. Finally, 
an economic analysis of total-sales royalty provisions suggests that 
they misuse the patent grant. 
A. The Rationale of the Zenith .Decision 
As Justice Harlan said, the language of the majority opinion in 
Zenith makes it difficult to discern precisely why a total-sales royalty 
provision constitutes patent misuse only when it is insisted upon by 
the patentee. The Court spoke conclusorily, asserting only that this 
kind of royalty provision unlawfully extends the patent monopoly. 
This section briefly dissects the possible justifications for the condi-
tioning test. 
First, the Court explained its decision with an analogy to the tie-
in cases. The tie-in cases, as we have seen, prohibit a patentee from 
"conditioning" the right to use the patent on the licensee's agreement 
to purchase, use, or sell another product not within the scope of the 
patentee's monopoly.64 The Zenith Court reasoned that 
just as the patent's leverage may not he used to extract from the licen-
see a commitment to purchase, use, or sell other products according to 
the desires of the patentee, neither can that leverage be used to gamer 
as royalties a percentage share of the licensee's receipts from sales of 
other products; in either case, the patentee seeks to extend the monop-
oly of his patent to derive a benefit not attributable to use of the pat-
ent's teaching.65 
The Court, then, suggested that conditioning, for both tie-ins and 
total-sales royalties, is illegal. 
total-sales royalties, as distinguished from other percentage-of-sale royalties based on patent 
use, have uniquely undesirable economic consequences. For further discussion, see notes 123-
27 iefra and accompanying text. 
64. See note 36 supra. 
65. 395 U.S. at 136. 
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That reasoning, however, is clearly unpersuasive. As the Court's 
confusion over the term "conditioning" illustrates, the Court failed 
to recognize the distinction between its holding and the reasoning of 
the tie-in cases. As used in the Zenith opinion, "conditioning" the 
grant of a license relates to the licensor's decision whether to grant 
the license. Under the Zenith test, it is unlawful to grant a license 
only upon the "condition" that the licensee pay royalties on products 
which do not use the teaching of the patent. It is the refusal to grant 
the license without this provision that the Court condemns as "con-
ditioning." The tie-in cases, on the other hand, make the negotia-
tions irrelevant and simply condemn, as a per se misuse, including in 
a license a "condition" which ties the sale ofunpatented materials to 
the sale or license of the patented product. 66 
Furthermore, if tie-in and total-sales royalty provisions are 
analogous, logic requires that they be treated similarly. If tie-in pro-
visions are per se misuse, total-sales royalty provisions should be 
condemned. But, while purporting to analogize tie-in and total-sales 
royalty provisions, the Court treats the two provisions quite differ-
ently. The tie-in cases, for example, reveal that a finding of a tie-in 
inevitably leads to a finding of misuse even if the patentee gave the 
licensee other alternatives or the licensee freely agreed to the provi-
sion. Zenith, on the other hand, held that a coerced total-sales roy-
alty provision is misuse, while a freely negotiated one is not. This 
odd result suggests that the Zenith Court considered total-sales roy-
alty provisions less onerous than tie-in provisions; it suggests that, in 
some way, the evils of total-sales royalties vanish when there has 
been no conditioning and the agreement was freely bargained for. 
As Justice Harlan pointed out, however, the Court failed to explain 
why a coerced acceptance of the royalty extends the patent monop-
oly while a freely negotiated acceptance does not. In either case, the 
patentee may "derive a benefit not attributable to the patent's teach-
ing."67 
66. See Morton Salt Co. v. G.S. Suppiger Co., 314 U.S. 488 (1942); Motion Picture Patents 
Co. v. Universal Film Mfg. Co., 243 U.S, 502 (1917). 
The Zenith Court cited two cases other than Motion Picture and Morion Sall to demon-
strate that patentees may not "condition the right to use [the] patent on the licensee's agree-
ment to purchase, use or sell . . . another article of commerce not within the patent 
monopoly." 395 U.S. at 136. Although both opinions appeared to hold that tie-in provisions 
violate the antitrust laws even though they are freely bargained for, both opinions did evidence 
sensitivity to the coercive aspects of tie-in provisions. See International Salt Co. v. United 
States, 332 U.S. 392, 395-96 (1947); Ethyl Gasoline Corp. v. United States, 309 U.S. 436, 455-
59 (1940). This sensitivity to coercion explains, perhaps, why the court cited these cases in lieu 
of Motion Picture and Morton Salt. Neither court, however, focussed on the negotiation pro-
cess or relied on coercion in reaching its decision. Thus the general rule remains the same: tie-
in provisions are per se violations of the patent and antitrust laws, and even a freely bargained-
for tie-in provision is patent misuse. 
61. See 395 U.S. at 136. 
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A second explanation for the Court's adoption of the condition-
ing test may be that it relied too heavily on the logic of the district 
court's injunction.68 Besides enjoining the conditioning of the total-
sales royalty provision, the district court prohibited the patentee 
from refusing to grant a license unless the licensee acquired other 
patents. The courts have condemned this practice as "mandatory 
package licensing."69 Package licensing is not economically undesir-
able if the licensee desires rights to all the patents in the package;70 it 
is only objectionable when the patentee forces the licensee to pay for 
undesired patents. Since the misuse associated with mandatory 
package licensing lends itself to expression in terms of "condition-
ing," and since both total-sales royalties and mandatory package 
licenses were similarly prohibited by the district court injunction, the 
Zenith Court may simply have assumed that total-sales royalty 
provisions are also undesirable only when "insisted upon." How-
ever, it is not at all clear that total-sales royalty provisions should be 
condemned only when the bargaining process is characterized by 
conditioning. Indeed, it will be argued below that the undesirable 
economic consequences of total-sales royalty provisions are not es-
caped when the parties freely bargain for the provision.71 
Third, the decision may also have resulted from the Court's con-
cern with overreaching by patentees_. That interpretation is substan-
tiated by the Court's implication that what is being condemned is the 
patentee's use of "leverage."72 If the decision rests on this ground, 
however, it is unsatisfactory. Since the Court concedes that a pur-
68. The injunction, quoted in note 49 supra, treated both the total-sales royalty and the 
patent package in one sentence. The court prohibited both provisions if they arose from condi-
tioning. 
69. American Securit Co. v. Shatterproof Glass Corp., 154 F. Supp. 890 (D. Del. 1957), 
ajfd., 268 F.2d 769 (3d Cir.), cert. denied, 361 U.S. 902 (1959), held that mandatory package 
licensing is a misuse of patents. See 13 HARV. L. REV. 1628 (1960). q. International Mfg. Co. 
v. Landon, Inc., 336 F.2d 723 (9th Cir. 1964), cert. denied, 319 U.S. 988 (1965) (the packaging 
of "blocking patents" which are so interrelated that they may reasonably be considered to 
constitute parts of a single distinct product does not constitute misuse). For an economic anal-
ysis of package licenses, see Note, Coercive Patent Package Licensing--The Need far a Rufe ef 
Reason, 14 WM. & MARYL. REV. 748 (1973). It argues that some benefits of package licenses 
may outweigh their economic disadvantages and proposes that the economic costs and benefits 
be balanced under a "rule of reason" judicial standard. 
70. It should be noted, however, that a nonmandatory package license may cause difficulty 
if the licensing agreement fails to provide for the reduction of royalties as the patents in the 
package expire. See Comment, Unreduced Royalty Arrangements and Packaged Patents: An 
Improper Extension efthe Patent Monopoly?, 66 MICH. L. REV. 1248 (1968). 
7 l. See text at Part III.C infra. 
72. See 395 U.S. at 136. 
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pose of the patent grant is to give the patentee "leverage" to garner 
high royalties,73 why should total-sales royalty provisions, as op-
posed to any other type of royalty provision, be singled out as partic-
ularly objectionable if "leverage" or "coercion" has been used? 
Rather, under the Court's reasoning, all types of royalty provisions 
should be condemned if conditioning is proved. Thus, the "lever-
age" rationale for the conditioning test, absent any additional eco-
nomic or patent-policy justification, is insufficient. 
This Part suggests, then, that the Zenith Court failed to justify 
adequately the conditioning test. The Court apparently believed 
that the ills of total-sales royalty provisions are avoided if the parties 
freely bargain. The Court, however, did not say why this is so: it 
simply concluded that conditioning the grant of a license upon ac-
ceptance of a total-sales royalty provision unlawfully extends the 
patent monopoly. 
B. Judicial Application of the Conditioning Test 
In his dissent in Zenith, Justice Harlan said that the conditioning 
test would prove "exceedingly difficult to apply" and would there-
fore cause "uncertainty in this area of business dealing."74 He antic-
ipated that "[i]n practice, it often will be very hard to tell whether a 
license provision was included at the instance of both parties or only 
at the will of the licensor."75 This Part tests the accuracy of that 
prediction and concludes that, despite the apparent ease with which 
the lower courts have applied the Zenith test, it will pose practical 
difficulties for the courts. While these difficulties may not, standing 
alone, justify overruling Zenith, they at least significantly decrease 
its desirability. 
I. The Conditioning Test in the Lower Courts 
The principles on which the lower courts have relied in applying 
the conditioning test can be readily stated. In order to find patent 
misuse under the Zenith test, a court must determine that the paten-
tee has conditioned its grant of a license on the licensee's acceptance 
of a total-sales royalty provision.76 In Zenith, the Supreme Court 
73. 395 U.S. at 135, 136 (citing Brulotte v. Thys Co., 379 U.S. 29, 33 (1964)). 
74. 395 U.S. at 141. 
75. 395 U.S. at 141. 
76. See Plastic Contact Lens Co. v. Frontier of the Northeast, Inc., 441 F.2d 67 (2d Cir. 
1971), cert. denied, 404 U.S. 881 (1971); Beckman Instruments, Inc. v. Technical Dev. Corp., 
433 F.2d 55 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 401 U.S. 976 (1970); Glen Mfg. Inc. v. Perfect Fit Indus., 
Inc., 420 F.2d 319 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 397 U.S. 1042 (1970); Blohm & Voss AG v. Pruden-
tial-Grace Lines, Inc., 346 F. Supp. 1116 (D. Md. 1972), rm/. on other grounds, 489 F.2d 231 
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held,77 as have the lower courts,78 that conditioning cannot be in-
ferred merely because the license agreement includes such a provi-
sion. Accordingly, the courts have placed the burden of introducing 
evidence of coercion or conditioning on the licensee.79 Courts ask (1) 
whether the provision was bargained for or insisted upon, 80 (2) 
whether the licensee made protests which were overridden by the 
licensor,81 (3) whether the patentee rejected the licensee's alternative 
proposals,82 and (4) whether the patentee failed to offer reasonable 
alternatives.83 Finally, although most courts have not construed 
Zenith as requiring the patentee to show that the parties used the 
provision for their mutual convenience, some courts have suggested 
that a provision's convenience or mutual benefit will be weighed in 
deciding whether it was freely bargained for.84 
A number of cases support these propositions and illustrate the 
apparent ease with which the courts have applied the Zenith test. In 
(4th Cir.), cert. denied, 419 U.S. 840 (1973); Chandler v. Stem Dental Laboratory Co., 335 F. 
Supp. 580 (S.D. Tex. 1971); Plastic Contact Lens Co. v. W.R.S. Contact Lens Laboratories, 
Inc., 330 F. Supp. 441 (S.D.N.Y. 1970); Mutchnik v. M.S. Willett, Inc., 274 Md. 610, 337 A.2d 
72 (1975). 
77. The Court stated: 
No such inference [of conditioning] follows from a mere license provision measuring roy-
alties by the licensee's total sales even if, as things work out, only some or none of the 
merchandise employs the patented idea or process, or even ifit was foreseeable that some 
undetermined portion would not contain the invention. 
395 U.S. at 138. 
78. Most lower courts have correctly looked to evidence beyond the face of the agreement 
itself. See, e.g., Glen Mfg. Inc. v. Perfect Fit Indus., Inc., 420 F.2d 319, 321 (2d Cir.), cert. 
denied, 397 U.S. 1042 (1970). Bui see Chandler v. Stem Dental Laboratory Co., 335 F. Supp. 
580 (S.D. Tex. 1971), discussed in text at notes 100-02 infra. 
79. See, e.g., Mutchnik v. M.S. Willett, Inc., 274 Md. 610, 619, 337 A.2d 75, 76 (1975). 
Similarly, the court in Plastic Contact Lens Co. v. W.R.S. Contact Lens Laboratories, Inc., 330 
F. Supp. 441,443 (S.D.N.Y. 1970), held that the licensee had the burden of showing "a posture 
on the part of the [patentee] which rejected alternative proposals by the [licensee]." 
80. Plastic Contact Lens Co. v. Frontier of the Northeast, Inc., 441 F.2d 67, 73 n.10 (2d Cir. 
1971), cert. denied, 404 U.S. 881 (1971); Glen Mfg. Inc. v. Perfect Fit Indus., Inc., 420 F.2d 319, 
321 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 397 U.S. 1042 (1970); Mutchnik v. M.S. Willett, Inc., 274 Md. 610, 
337 A.2d 75 (1975). 
81. See cases cited in note 80 supra. 
82. Plastic Contact Lens Co. v. W.R.S. Contact Lens Laboratories, Inc., 330 F. Supp. 441, 
443 (S.D.N.Y. 1970). 
83. See Plastic Contact Lens Co. v. W.R.S. Contact Lens Laboratories, Inc., 330 F. Supp. 
441,443 (S.D.N.Y. 1970). 
84. See, e.g., Glen Mfg. Inc. v. Perfect Fit Indus., Inc., 324 F. Supp. 1133, 1137 (1971), 
discussed in text at notes 95-98 infra, where the court stated that 
Plaintiff has failed to show that the License Contract involved was executed for the mu-
tual convenience of the parties. In fact it is clear that its purpose was for the sole mone-
tary convenience of the plaintiff. . . . If the reason for employing the royalty provision 
which is based on total sales is the mutual convenience of both of the parties rather than 
as leverage from which the licensor can extract payment for the manufacture of unpat-
ented items, there is no patent misuse. 
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Plastic Contact Lens Co. v. W.R.S. Contact Lens Laboratories, Inc. ,85 
for example, the licensing agreement provided for a fixed royalty on 
each corneal contact lens sold by the licensee. 86 The agreement, in 
other words, required the licensee to p;y royalties even on the manu-
facture and sale of lenses which did not embody or make use of the 
patent. When the plaintiff, an assignee of the patent, sued to recover 
royalties under the license agreement, the licensee replied that royal-
ties based on total sales rather than solely on patent use constituted 
misuse. The court rejected the licensee's argument, finding that the 
Zenith conditioning test had not been met. In support of its conclu-
sion that the licensee had entered into the agreement freely, volunta-
rily, and with full understanding of its terms, the court relied on the 
plaintiffs offer of an alternative proposal calling for royalties, at 
slightly higher rates per end product, only upon the sale of those 
lenses which use the patent.87 The court noted that, during the ne-
gotiations, defendants had been represented by counsel, and it found 
no evidence that the plaintiff had induced the contract by misrepre-
sentation or by physical or economic duress.88 Thus, the court con-
cluded that the plaintiff had not refused to license on a basis other 
than a total-sales royalty.89 
The court in Mutchnik v. MS. Willett, Inc. 90 considered a some-
what more complex set of facts. The plaintiff, Mutchnik, had 
granted the defendant, Willett, a ten-year exclusive license to manu-
facture and sell a metal table slide. The agreement specified that 
Willett, or any of its sub-licensees, would pay royalties of five per-
cent of the highest gross invoiced prices of its slides. The agreement 
further provided that if Willett or any of its sub-licensees manufac-
tured or sold any slide not covered by the Mutchnik design, the five-. 
percent royalty would also apply. When the plaintiff sued to recover 
royalties under the contract, the licensee argued that an agreement 
85. 330 F. Supp. 441 (S.D.N.Y. 1970). 
86. In this case, the agreement provided: 
Licensee, solely for the purpose of accounting hereunder, agrees to pay Solex royalties 
upon such devices consisting of pieces of finished material in which two lens surfaces are 
applied thereto and which are adapted to be or are made into a finished or unfinished 
corneal contact lens calculated in accordance with the following schedule on all such de-
vices sold by Licensee. 
330 F. Supp. at 442 (emphasis added). This provision, then, provided for a "flat-rate" total-
sales royalty to be paid upon the product's sale. See note 7 supra. 
87: 330 F. Supp. at 443. 
88. 330 F. Supp. at 442. 
89. 330 F. Supp. at 444. 
90. 274 Md. 610, 337 A.2d 72 (1975). 
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requiring that royalties be paid on items other than those described 
and claimed in the patent constituted patent misuse. 
The lower court accepted the misuse defense and found that ille-
gal conditioning of the license had been established.91 The lower 
court reasoned that Mutchnik, aware ofWillett's substantial tooling-
up expense in expectation of a license grant, had exerted "leverage" 
by insisting on the provision and that Mutchnik's tactic of indicating 
that others were interested in the patent pressured the licensee. The 
appellate court reversed. It placed the burden of showing coercion 
on the licensee92 and concluded that the evidence relied upon by the 
lower court did not support a finding of conditioning under the 
Zenith test: ''There is no evidence that the Mutchniks refused to li-
cense on any basis other than a total-sales royalty, or overrode any 
objection which Willett may have had to the provision, or rejected 
any alternative proposal which Willett may have advanced."93 In-
deed, the court doubted that the total-sales royalty was ever a "bone 
of contention" between the parties, much less that it was demanded 
by the Mutchniks.94 
In contrast to the courts in the above two cases, the court in Glen 
Manefacturing Inc. v. Perfect Fit Industries, Inc. ,95 found patent mis-
use under the conditioning test. As in the previously mentioned 
cases, the licensing agreement based royalties on total sales rather 
than solely on patent use.96 The court explained that the patentee, 
by consistently employing a standardized total-sales royalty provi-
sion in numerous licensing agreements over a three-year period, had 
· established a policy of refusing to grant licenses unless they con-
91. See 274 Md. at 614, 337 A.2d at 74. 
92. 274 Md. at 618,337 A.2d at 76. Indeed, the court explicitly declined to construe Zenith 
as holding that the payment of royalties on unpatented goods, except for the convenience of 
the parties, constitutes patent misuse. 274 Md. at 620, 337 A.2d at 77. 
93. 274 Md. at 619, 337 A.2d at 76. 
94. 274 Md. at 619, 337 A.2d at 76. 
95. 324 F. Supp. 1133 (S.D.N.Y. 1971). Glen, the plaintiff, held a patent on toilet-tank 
covers. The district court originally held that Glen's licensing agreement with the defendant, 
Perfect Fit, constituted a patent misuse because it required the payment of royalties on all 
toilet-tank covers sold by Perfect Fit and not only on those within the scope of the patent 299 
F. Supp. 278 (S.D.N.Y. 1969). This holding was affirmed in a supplemental opinion. 299 F. 
Supp. at 283. 
The Second Circuit, citing the then-recent Court decision in Zenith, remanded the case to 
the district court "for further findings on the issue of 'conditioning' and an explicit determina-
tion of whether the license amounted to patent misuse under Zeniih." Glen Mfg. Inc. v. Per-
fect Fit Indus., Inc., 420 F.2d 319, 321 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 397 U.S. 1042 (1970) (footnote 
omitted). 
On remand, the district court held that the patentee's conditioning of the license on pay-
ment of a royalty on the total sales of toilet-tank covers made the contract unenforceable 
against the manufacturer. 324 F. Supp. 1133 (S.D.N.Y. 1971). 
96. This royalty provision is quoted in note 7 supra. 
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tained such provisions.97 As further support for its conclusion, the 
court noted that the plaintiff had charged other manufacturers with 
infringement ~d had given them the choice of accepting the stan-
dard license or- discontinuing the manufacture of the product. Fi-
nally, the court found that the patentee had failed to rebut this proof 
or show that the agreement was entered into for the mutual conve-
nience of the parties. 
Glen is significant for two reasons. First, it suggests that condi-
tioning may be inferred from a licensor's practice of refusing to li-
cense without the inclusion of a total-sales royalty. Second, it 
suggests that a finding of misuse does not depend on affirmative evi-
dence that the licensee protested or requested some alternative form 
of royalty arrangement.98 This may depart from language in Zenith 
which notes that conditioning depends, in part, on the licensor's re-
jection of the licensee's alternative proposals and protests.99 To the 
extent that other courts accept the Glen court's inferences, the licen-
see's task of proving conditioning will be eased. 
Finally, in at least one case, Chandler v. Stern Dental Laboratory 
Co., 100 the court simply misinterpreted the Zenith test. In that case, 
the patentee alleged that the licensee had violated the antitrust and 
patent laws, and, as in the other cases, the licensee contended that 
total-sales royalty provisions constitute patent misuse. Although the 
court concluded that the patentee insisted upon and coerced the li-
censee into accepting the provision, the agreement itself was appar-
ently the only evidence upon which the court relied.101 The Zenith 
97. 324 F. Supp. at I 136-37. 
98. A corollary of this proposition raises an intriguing question. As note 24 supra suggests, 
patent misuse may be a defense to an infringement suit even though the infringer was not 
harmed by the misuse. In other words, if an infringer refuses a licensing agreement providing 
for an illegal tie-in provision, the infringer can raise the tie-in provision as a defense to the 
patentee's infringement suit. In a total-sales royalty situation, however, it is unclear whether 
the courts would permit an infringer who has refused a total-sales royalty provision to use later 
evidence of the patentee's past practice of conditioning as a defense to an infringement suit. 
On one hand, it can be argued that this situation is no different from that posed by the tie-in 
cases: since conditioning licenses on total-sales royalties is just as undesirable as a tie-in provi-
sion. infringers should be able to raise patent misuse as a defense in both circumstances. On 
the other hand, since the Zenith case holds that the mere use of a total-sales royalty is not per 
se patent misuse, it might be reasonable to insist that the infringer show evidence of condition-
ing. If the infringer has refused the licensing arrangement, the infringer will be hard pressed to 
show that he was "coerced" into accepting the license. In any event, a licensee who hasfteely 
agreed to a total-sales royalty should not be permitted to use evidence of the patentee's past 
history of conditioning as a defense to an infringement suit. If this were allowed, the condi-
tioning test would be effectively circumvented, since the total-sales royalty was not imposed 
upon the licensee. 
99. 395 U.S. at 138, 139. For a discussion of those cases in accord with Zenith, see notes 
16-84 supra and accompanying text. 
100. 335 F. Supp. 580 (S.D. Tex. 1971). 
101. This conclusion is supported by the court's statement that 
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rule, however, clearly requires external evidence of conditioning: 
"no . . . inference [ of conditioning] follows from the mere licensing 
provision." 102 
2. Potential Problems Under the Zenith Test 
As these cases show, the lower courts have easily applied the 
Zenith conditioning test. Nevertheless, this facility may be more ap-
parent than real. That is, the courts, by glossing over the practical 
difficulties presented by the test, may have improperly applied it in 
these cases. Or, this facility may simply reflect the fact that the 
courts have not yet had to face the perplexities of evaluating the fair-
ness of a total-sales royalty provision arising out of complex negotia-
tions. To the extent that future cases involve such negotiations, the 
Zenith test will be harder to apply and easier to misapply. 103 
It might of course be argued that evidence that there had been 
complex negotiations should simplify the judicial task. Such evi-
dence might create a presumption that the parties freely bargained 
for the total-sales royalty provision. Since, however, the patentee 
might have been "careful to embellish the negotiations with an alter-
native proposal,"104 evidence of an alternative proposal would re-
quire the court to determine whether the alternative was offered in 
good faith or was instead a calculated, subtle form of coercion. If 
the patentee, for example, offered clearly unattractive alternatives to 
the licensee, it might still be legitimately concluded that the patentee 
had conditioned its grant of-the license on the licensee's acceptance 
[A]t the trial plaintiffs asserted a right to receive royalties on certain thermoplastic sheets, 
as well as similar teeth protector devices manufactured or sold by defendants. By plain-
tiff's own admissions these products do not come within the scope of the Chandler patent. 
As a result, it is this Court's conclusion that the patent has been misused. 
335 F. Supp. at 583. 
The court also referred to the licensing provision which required that all the licensee's 
improvements of the patent become the property of the original patentee, a kind of provision 
commonly referred to as a "grant-back." The Chandler court seems to suggest that a grant-
back provision is evidence of conditioning. However, in Transparent-Wrap Mach. Corp. v. 
Stokes & Smith Co., 329 U.S. 637 (1947), the Court held that grant-backs are not unenforce-
able per se and distinguished tie-ins from grant-backs. Tie-ins, according to the Court, expand 
the monopoly power to nonpatented products while grant-backs involve "using one legalized 
monopoly to acquire another legalized monopoly." 329 U.S. at 644. This language suggests, 
contrary to the Chandler court's inference, that the mere inclusion of a grant-back in a license 
which includes a total-sales royalty is not sufficient proof of use of leverage to satisfy the 
conditioning test. For a judicial history and economic analysis of grant-backs, see Co=ent, 
The Validity of Grant-Back Clauses in Patent Licensing Agreements, 42 U. CHI. L. REV. 733 
(1975). 
102. 395 U.S. at 138. 
103. See 395 U.S. at 141 (Harlan J., dissenting). 
104. This was the concern expressed by Justice Harlan in his dissent in Zenith. 395 U.S. at 
142. 
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of the total-sales royalty provision. Thus, a total-sales royalty provi-
sion should not be deemed "bargained for" simply because the nego-
tiations were complex or because the patentee offered alternative 
proposals. 105 
The problems with a test which requires a subsequent judicial 
evaluation of the parties' negotiations are obvious. First, the court 
must perform the difficult task of determining the reasonableness of 
the patentee's alternative proposals in light of the economic condi-
tions at the time of the negotiations rather than at the time of the 
suit. Suppose a patentee offers to license its patent for either a total-
sales or a fixed lump-sum royalty. Although the court could assess 
the reasonableness of the patentee's alternative lump-sum proposal 
by comparing the amount actually paid under the total-sales royalty 
with the amount proposed under the fixed lump-sum royalty, this 
may lead to the wrong result. 
For instance, the court could be easily led to assume that an al-
ternative lump-sum royalty offered by the licensor was reasonable 
simply because it would have yielded lower royalty payments than 
those actually made under the total-sales royalty. This situation 
would result if the parties failed to anticipate that the licensee would 
either (1) sell end products on which a royalty is due even though the 
end product made no use of the patent or (2) improve the end prod-
uct so as to increase its sales. To the extent the parties miscalculated 
at the time of negotiations, then, the alternative lump-sum proposal 
ought to be deemed unreasonable even though the licensee would 
have paid less under it than under the total-sales royalty provision. 
As the above example illustrates, a second related difficulty with 
the Zenith test is that it not only requires the court to gauge the eco-
nomic conditions at the time of the negotiations, but it also requires 
the court to reconstruct the parties' perceptions of and forecasts for 
the various proposals. Since those perceptions an4 forecasts are ex-
tremely speculative when made, and since those of the patentee may 
differ from those of the licensee, they resist judicial reconstruction. 
A third difficulty with the Zenith test is that the court, in deter-
mining the reasonableness of the licensor's alternatives, must recog-
105. This problem is not unknown in patent litigation. In package-licensing cases, see text 
at note 69 supra, courts frequently evaluate the reasonableness of the patentee's alternative 
offers to determine if the patentee had coerced the licensee to accept a package-licensing provi-
sion. A good example of this can be found in Hazeltine Research, Inc. v. Zenith Radio Corp., 
239 F. Supp. 51, 69-72 (N.D. Ill. 1965), qffd in relevant part, 388 F.2d 25, 33-34 (7th Cir. 1967), 
qffd in part and revd in part on other grounds, 395 U.S. 100 (1969). The court of appeals noted, 
for example, that the patentee's alternative offers were "a transparent attempt" to force the 
licensee to accept a package-licensing arrangement. 
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nize that total-sales proposals typically provide for a lower royalty 
rate than royalty proposals based solely on patent use. A total-sales 
royalty is often convenient for the licensor-it facilitates the admin-
istration of the license and allows the licensor to avoid many of the 
infringement problems and litigation expenses that may be encoun-
tered if royalties are paid only on the sale of end products which use 
the patent's teaching. Accordingly, royalty proposals based solely on 
patent use ought to reflect the risk of these additional costs. Some-
what similarly, the court must also be aware of an additional reason 
for higher royalty rates when a royalty is based solely on patent use: 
since a royalty based on patent use means that royalties will be paid 
upon a smaller group of end products, the patentees charge a higher 
rate per end product sold. Both of these factors are easy to overlook, 
difficult to calculate, and make the court's evaluation of alternatives 
less precise. 106 
Since courts commonly reconstruct past events, the difficulties 
presented by the Zenith test should not be overplayed. Nevertheless, 
the test, as Justice Harlan suggested, 107 requires judgments of unu-
sual difficulty. This has two implications. First, the courts, in order 
to reduce business uncertainty as well as to simplify their own deci-
sions, may attempt to promulgate rules distinguishing bargained-for 
from coerced agreements. The courts, for example, may decree that 
certain types of alternative proposals are "per se" reasonable, so that 
if the patentee offers those alternatives, the agreement on the total-
sales royalty provision will be deemed freely bargained for. The 
promulgation of such rules, however, must contravene the intent of 
the Zenith test. In some instances the line drawn will be arbitrary, 
while in other cases patentees will become adept at couching unrea-
sonable alternative proposals in terms acceptable to the court. In 
either case, the court would mistakenly approve coerced agreements. 
Second, rather than rely on rules, the courts may continue to re-
solve these disputes case by case. This would only intensify business 
uncertainty and, for that reason, would discourage total-sales royalty 
provisions. Under the Zenith test, if the licensee failed to protest the 
inclusion of a total-sales royalty provision, the validity of the provi-
106. A further difficulty should be mentioned. In Automatic Radio and Zenith, the license 
agreements also provided that the licensee could use any patent subsequently acquired by the 
licensor. Such provisions confuse the Court's analysis of alternative proposals because the 
licensees speculate on the possibility that the licensor will acquire a valuable patent during the 
term of the license. To the extent there is such a likelihood, the licensee will find the licensor's 
proposal more attractive. A court, however, could not easily reconstruct and evaluate the ef-
fect that the "future patents" proposal had upon the bargaining process. 
107. 395 U.S. at 141 (Harlan, J., dissenting). 
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sion would be relatively well assured. 108 But once the negotiations 
focussed on the provision, uncertainty would arise. As was discussed 
above, if the provision is to be upheld, the Zenith test suggests the 
licensor develop a record of "reasonableness" by not rejecting the 
licensee's alternative proposals and by offering alternatives of its 
own. However, the licensor can never be certain that a court will 
determine that the licensor acted reasonably. As a result, licensors, 
rather than insisting upon a total-sales royalty provision and risking 
the loss of a later infringement suit, may conclude that once the to-
tal-sales royalty becomes a "bone of contention," it should be aban-
doned altogether. Although it will be argued below that such 
discouragement is desirable, this result was certainly not the goal of 
the Zenith Court. Applying the Zenith test case by case might also 
encourage courts to sanction total-sales royalties which are, in fact, 
conditioned. The licensee's burden of showing conditioning nor-
mally can be met only if the licensee protested the total-sales royalty 
provision and can document the negotiation process. 109 To the ex-
tent that this is too heavy a burden on the licensee, the courts may 
uphold coerced agreements. 
Finally, even if the Zenith test effectively prevents "coerced" 
agreements, it still ought to be abandoned because it sanctions some 
total-sales royalties. This Note now will argue that all such royalties 
should constitute patent misuse. 
C. Total-Sales Royalties as Patent Misuse 
The Zenith test is not only difficult to apply in practice; it is 
fundamentally flawed in principle. Pace Justice Harlan, this Note 
contends that all total-sales royalty provisions, regardless of whether 
they have been "conditioned," have undesirable economic conse-
quences and ought to constitute patent misuse. Because total-sales 
royalties add a variable cost110 to each end product111 sold by the 
licensee, they undermine the patent policy by discouraging inven-
108. See Zenith Radio Corp. v. Hazeltine Research, Inc., 395 U.S. 100, 138 (1969). Bui see 
Glen Mfg. Inc. v. Perfect Fit Indus., Inc., 324 F. Supp. 1133 (S.D.N.Y. 1971) (implying that 
conditioning may be found even if the licensee fails to protest the provision). 
109. See text at note 108 supra. 
110. Variable costs are those costs which increase with the level of output. C. McCoN• 
NELL, ECONOMICS 501 (6th ed. 1975). A total-sales royalty adds a variable cost to each end 
product, since the required royalty payments will increase as sales and output increase. Fixed 
costs, in contrast, do not vary with changes in output and must be paid even if the firm's output 
is zero. Id. at 500. Since a fixed lump-sum royalty does not vary with production or sales, it is 
a fixed cost. Net profit, of course, is the difference between total revenue and total costs (the 
sum of fixed and variable costs). 
11 l. See note 7 supra. 
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tion, and they restrain competition by deterring licensees from enter-
ing new markets. So long as the licensee sells the product covered by 
the royalty, the licensee must pay royalties on the sale of each end 
product even though it makes no use of the patent; and since this 
variable cost is unavoidable, 112 a total-sales royalty distorts the licen-
see's decisions. The next two sub-parts support and elaborate this 
proposition. 
1. Economic Effects upon the Patent Policy 
The patent-misuse doctrine, we have said, is grounded in the pat-
ent grant's purpose: "to promote the Progress of Science and useful 
Arts." 113 In neither Zenith nor Automatic Radio, however, did the 
Court consider whether a royalty based on total sales rather than 
solely on patent use disserves that policy and, if so, whether the con-
ditioning test eliminates that disservice. 
The first undesirable patent-policy consequence of a total-sales 
royalty provision is that it discourages inventive activity by the licen-
see. Suppose that a manufacturer decides to produce a product 
which uses an existing patent and that it agrees to pay royalties to the 
licensor on the product's total sales. Since the licensee would have to 
pay royalties even if the end product did not use the patent, substi-
tuting an internally developed patent for the licensed patent would 
not reduce the end product's variable costs and the licensee would 
have little incentive to invest in research and development to "invent 
around" the licensed patent. In contrast, if the licensing arrange-
ment provided for the payment of royalties only when the patent was 
used, substituting a new patent would enable the licensee to avoid 
paying the royalties for the original patent and would thereby reduce 
the variable cost of each end product. The licensee, then, would 
have a greater incentive to invest in research and development. 114 
112. The variable cost can be avoided, of course, only if the licensee declines to sell prod-
ucts covered by the royalty. 
113. U.S. CONST. art. I,§ 8, cl. 8. See Morton Salt Co. v. G.S. Suppiger Co., 314 U.S. 488 
(1942). 
114. Suppose, for example, a company sells 500 units or end products of product A each 
year. Further, suppose that product A embodies a patent and that the company enters into a 
five-year license agreement with the patentee under which the company must pay $10 for each 
unit it produces or sells which uses the teaching of the patent. During year I, the company 
spends $10,000 on research and eventually develops an invention which can be substituted in 
year 2 for the licensed patent. If it is assumed that the costs of producing the substitute and the 
original are equal, substitution will result fa a reduction in royalty payments of $10 per unit 
sold. (It is irrelevant whether the royalty is flat-rate or percentage.) This is true because the 
company, under the licensing agreement, is not obligated to pay royalties on those units or end 
products which make no use of the original patent. The savings which will result from this 
substitution can be calculated as follows: 
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Similarly, but more significantly, total-sales royalty provisions 
discourage invention by diminishing the market opportunities for in-
ventors other than licensees: a total-sales royalty provision gives a 
licensee little reason to solicit a license on a substitute invention. For 
example, again suppose that a manufacturer has licensed a patent 
under a total-sales royalty provision. Further suppose that, by sub-
stituting a new patent for the licensed patent, the licensee could im-
prove its end product so as to increase either its sales or sales price 
and thereby increase its total revenue. Unfortunately for the licensee 
and inventor, however, such a· substitution, far from lessening the 
licensee's obligation to pay royalties on the sale of the end product, 
would increase the licensee's royalty payments. 115 Substitution 
would make economic sense only in those uncommon cases in which 
the increase in the licensee's total revenue116 or in his cost savings 
outweighed the added royalties that would have to be paid to the 
patentee of the substitute invention. 117 Licensees unable to project 
units sold per year 
royalties saved per unit sold 
annual savings 
remaining term of the license in years 
total royalties avoided 







net savings $10000 
(For purposes of simplification, savings have not been discounted to present values, as a more 
accurate analysis would require.) 
In contrast, if the company had entered into a total-sales arrangement, substitution would 
not reduce its royalty payments for the original patent. Accordingly, it would make economic 
sense to invest in research and development only if the production costs of the substitute in-
vention were less than those of the patented item and variable costs were consequently lower. 
The difficulty of predicting these figures discourages such research and development. 
I 15. If substitution leads to an increased sales price, rather than to increased sales, royal-
ties under a total-sales royalty provision will also increase if the total-sales royalty is based on 
a "percentage" of total dollar sales. See note 7 supra for a discussion of "percentage" and 
"flat-rate" total-sales royalties. Thus, the only situation in which royalties under a total-sales 
provision will not increase is when the royalty is based solely on the amount of sales (a "ftat-
rate" provision) and the substitution leads to an increased sales price. 
I 16. A substitute patent may improve the end product and enable the licensee to increase 
its sales or its sales price. To the extent this occurs, the licensee's total revenue will of course 
rise. 
I 17. If the original patent is licensed under a total-sales royalty provision, the increase in 
total revenue required to justify licensing a substitute patent can be determined as follows: 
assume 
P = net profits 
S1 = sales price per unit prior to substitution 
S2 = sales price per unit after substitution 
F = fixed costs 
V = variable costs (including the total-sales royalty on the original 
patent) 
Q1 = quantity sold prior to substitution 
Q2 = quantity sold after substitution 
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such a revenue increase must be uninterested in purchasing a substi-
so that 
P = (S • 0) - [F + (V • 0)] 
Thus, if the licensee is to pay fixed royalties for the substitute patent (Rb), it would make 
economic sense to license the substitute patent only when 
(S2 • 02) - [(F +Rb)+ (V • 02)] 
> 
(S1 • 0 1) - [F + (V • 01)] 
Similarly, if the licensee is to pay a royalty for the substitute patent of a variable amount per 
unit sold (Rb), it would make economic sense to license the substitute patent only when 
(S2 • 0 2) - [F + [Q2(V +Rb)]] . 
> 
(S1 • 01) - [F + (V • 01)] 
These two equations assume that the original patent is licensed under a total-sales royalty 
provision. If, however, the royalty on the original patent is based solely on patent use, it is 
more likely that the licensing of a substitute patent would make economic sense, since the 
elimination of royalties on the original patent will reduce the product's variable costs by Ra 
per unit. If, for example, the licensee is to pay fixed royalties for the substitute patent (Rb), it 
would make economic sense to license the substitute patent when 
(S2 • 02) - [(F + Rb) + [02(V - Ra)]] 
> 
(S1 • 01) - [F + (V • 01)] 
Similarly, if the licensee is to pay a royalty of a variable amount per unit sold (Rb) for the 
substitute patent, it would make economic sense to license the substitute patent when 
(S2 • 0 z) - [F + [02(V + Rb - Ra)]] 
> 
(S1 • 0 1) - [F + (V • 01)] 
These conclusions can be more clearly illustrated by the following examples. The exam-
ples will be based on these assumptions: 
S1 = $10 
S2 = $11 
F = $10,000 
V = $8 
01 = 10,000 
02 = 11,000 
Ra= $2 
(I) Suppose the licensee is to pay a fixed royalty of $20,000 for the substitute patent (Rb 
= $20,000). If the originar patent is licensed under a total-sales royalty, then 
($11 X 11,000) - [($10,000 + $20,000) +($8 X 11,000)] 
= $121,000 - $118,000 
= $3,000 
< 
($10 X 10,000) - [10,000 + {$8 X 10,000)] 
= $100,000 - $90,000 
= $10,000. 
In other words, under the above facts, it would not make economic sense for the licensee to 
license a substitute patent even though the substitute patent would lead to increased sales of 
1000 units at a selling price 10 per cent higher. (For purposes of simplicity, this example 
assumes the original patent is licensed under a "flat-rate" total-sales royalty provision. See 
note 7 supra. If a "percentage" total-sales royalty provision had been employed, then the 
royalty per unit sold (Ra) after the substitution would be equal to the applicable percentage 
rate multiplied by the sales price per unit after the substitution.) 
Conversely, if the royalty on the original patent is based solely on patent use, it would 
make economic sense, under the above facts, for the licensee to license a substitute patent. 
This is because · 
($11 X 11,000) - [($10,000 + $20,000) + [11,000 ($8 - $2)]) 




(2) Now suppose the licensee is to pay a royalty of a variable amount of $2 per unit sold 
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tute patent, and the market for new inventions will be reduced. 118 
Conversely, if the royalty on the original patent is based solely on 
patent use, licensees would more often find it profitable to solicit and 
license a substitute patent, since substitution would relieve the licen-
see of the obligation to pay royalties on those end products which 
did not use the original patent. The variable cost of each end prod-
uct, in other words, would be reduced. Licensees would find substi-
tution profitable either where the substitute patent license called for 
lower total royalty payments or where the substitution resulted in 
product improvements which increased total revenues. 119 
Total-sales royalty provisions, then, discourage invention and 
thus undermine the patent policy. Moreover, the Zenith condition-
ing test does not prevent that consequence. Even a convenient or 
freely bargained for total-sales royalty provision limits the market 
for new inventions in the product lines subject to the royalty. 
The conditioning test might be justifiable if it measured whether 
the licensee planned to "invent around" the patent or to license sub-
stitute patents. If the parties had freely bargained for the total-sales 
royalty, a court might infer that the licensee did not contemplate "in-
venting around" the patent or licensing substitute patents and that 
therefore the total-sales royalty agreement would not affect the pat-
for the substitute patent (Rb = $2). If the original patent is licensed under a total-sales royalty 
provision, the licensee would not license a substitute patent. This is because 
($11 X 11,000) - [$10,000 + (11,000 ($8 + $2)1] 




If, on the other hand, the royalty on the original patent is based solely on patent use, the 
licensee would license the substitute patent. This is because 
($11 X ll,000) - r$10,000 + (11,000 ($8 + $2 - $2)]] 




This Note has discussed the amount by which total revenue must increase to justify the 
licensing of a substitute patent. Although the amount by which costs must be reduced to jus-
tify substitution could be similarly estimated, this Note does not undertake to do so. 
118. New producers, of course, may enter the market. To the extent they purchase new 
patents, market foreclosure may not be significant. Nevertheless, the removal of only a few 
potential patent purchasers from the market may significantly reduce the opportunities of in-
ventors. From the perspective of the inventor, that reduction is particularly acute in those 
product lines where a certain patent is almost a prerequisite to the manufacture and sale of the 
end product. If the patentee of such a patent has licensed most of the manufacturers of the 
product under a total-sales royalty provision, the outside inventor who seeks to create a new 
patent in the area would be almost completely foreclosed. The inventor would not be fore-
closed, of course, if the substitute patent generated cost savings greater than the total-sales 
royalty payments. 
119. See note 117 supra. 
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ent policy. However, since future inventions are typically unforesee-
able, it cannot sensibly be inf erred that a licensee knew in advance 
whether it would be economically benefitted by seeking a substitute 
patent. But even if the licensee fully calculated the risk of unforesee-
able future inventions and concluded that a total-sales royalty was 
advantageous, and even if the conditioning test reflected those calcu-
lations, the conditioning test remains unsatisfactory, since the goals 
of the licensee are not those of the patent policy. The societal inter-
est in inventive activity is harmed whenever a total-sales royalty dis-
courages the licensee from "inventing around" the original patent or 
soliciting a substitute patent. The conditioning test leaves un-
touched, for example, the prospective inventor's deprivation of the 
market opportunities !esulting from the licensing of many producers 
under a total-sales royalty provision. 120 
2. Economic Effects and Antitrust Policy 
Automatic Radio, we have seen, held that total-sales royalty pro-
visions create "no restraint of competition beyond the legitimate 
grant of the patent."121 Since Zenith did not overrule that holding 
and did not discuss the anticompetitive effects inherent in the royalty 
provision, the Zenith Court also must have concluded that-at least 
where the provision was not forced upon the licensee-a total-sales 
royalty provision lacks anticompetitive effects. Since restraint of 
competition is a legitimate concern of the misuse doctrine, 122 a fuller 
analysis of the anticompetitive eij'ects of total-sales royalties is war-
ranted. 
Justice Harlan, in his dissent in Zenith, referred to and rejected 
Professor Baxter's economic analysis of legal restrictions on the ex-
ploitation of the patent monopoly. 123 Baxter argued that all royalties 
based on a percentage of a lice11see's sales of "unpatented end prod-
ucts" should be prohibited because they restrain output and increase 
prices of the unpatented end products incommensurately with the 
value of the invention. 124 By ''unp~tented end product" Baxter 
120. See note 118 supra. 
121. 339 U.S. at 833. 
122. See note 26 supra and accompanying text. 
123. 395 U.S. at 145. See Baxter, supra note 60. 
124. See Baxter, supra note 60, at 356. Baxte.fs ;malysis is complex and difficult to follow. 
The relevant part of his reasoning, however, can be explained as follows. As a general pro-
position a producer uses various proportions of goods and services, or inputs, in the production 
of a given end product. This production "recipe'"is l]SUally flexible, so that the amount of each 
input used to produce the end product can vary according to the cost of the input and its 
marginal physical product. (Marginal physical product of an input is the change in output that 
will result from an incremental change in the quantity of a single input, while other inputs are 
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meant a product sold by the licensee which uses a licensed patent but 
which is not as a whole patented. 125 The licensed patent is merely 
part of the recipe for the end product. 
Baxter condemned all percentage-of-sale royalties and did not 
distinguish total-sales royalties from percentage-of-sale royalties that 
require a royalty only on those end products which employ the li-
censed patent. Since the practice of calculating royalties upon the 
sale of end products has long been accepted by business and by the 
courts, 126 it is not surprising that Justice Harlan rejected Baxter's 
analysis and declined to condemn all percentage-of-sales royalties. 
What both Justice Harlan and Professor Baxter missed, however, is 
that total-sales royalties-as distinguished from other royalties based 
on end product sales-have particularly undesirable anticompetitive 
effects and can be independently condemned. 127 Specifically, a total-
sales royalty, unlike a percentage-of-sales royalty based solely on 
patent use, may prevent the licensee from entering new markets. 128 
held constant.) If a patented input, say factor A, has no use other than as an input of unpat-
ented end product X, there are several ways the licensor-monopolist of A can garner larger 
monopoly profits. One of these is to use a royalty based on a percentage of licensee sales of the 
unpatented end product X. Under such a royalty the licensee will pay nothing for the incre-
mental use of the invention A in the production of any given output. This discourages the 
substitution of other inputs for the licensed input A. The licensee cannot substitute against his 
own output other than by restricting it and raising his prices just as a monopolist would. Bax-
ter concluded that this monopolization of X will lead to the underutilization of all inputs even 
if the production recipe is efficient. Given the trade-off between greater X output and an 
efficient production recipe, Baxter argued that the social gain attributable to greater X produc-
tion outweighed the disutility elsewhere in the economy imposed by incremental consumption 
of other inputs. 
125. This Note uses "end product" to mean a product unit that may or may not embody a 
patent. See note 6 supra. Baxter's use of the term differs in that he refers to a product unit 
which is not patented but does embody a patent. 
126. See Oppenheim & Scott, 14 IDEA 193, supra note 6. Indeed, Baxter himself recog-
nized that most royalties are based on a percentage of the licensee's sales. Baxter, supra note 
60, at 302. 
127. The purpose of this Note is not to advocate a reform as far-reaching as that proposed 
by Baxter, but to attempt to distinguish total-sales royalties from other royalties based upon 
end product sales and to point out that the economic evils inherent in the total-sales royalty are 
greater than those of the ordinary royalty based upon end product sales. 
128. In deciding whether or not to make an investment, firms often use "break-even" anal-
ysis. See J. WESTEN & E. BRIGHAM, MANAGERIAL FINANCE 71-76 (6th ed. 1978). Break-even 
analysis determines the point at which sales equal total costs. In other words, break-even 
analysis is a technique for studying the relationship among fixed costs, variable costs, and 
profits. If a firm's costs were all variable, the problem of break-even volume would seldom 
arise; a firm with some variable and some fixed costs must suffer losses until a given volume 
has been reached. The break-even point is described algebraically as follows: 
If: S = sales price per unit 
Q = quantity produced and sold 
F = fixed costs 
V = variable costs per unit 
Then: S • Q=F+V•Q 
S•Q-V•Q=F 
Q (S-V) = F 
Q (at break-even point)= -8 F -v 
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A total-sales royalty attaches a variable cost to end products even 
though they do not use the patent. 129 This variable cost cannot be 
avoided by substituting a new patent: so long as the licensee contin-
ues to sell the product covered by the royalty, the licensee must pay 
royalties even though the end product makes no use of the patent. 130 
These facts may discourage the licensee from entering other market 
segments131 for the product covered by the royalty. Suppose that a 
lens manufacturer decides to sell hard contact lenses and desires to 
license a hard-lens patent. Further suppose that the hard-lens paten-
tee and the manufacturer agree to a total-sales royalty provision call-
ing for a royalty on the sale of any contact lens. If opportunities 
were to develop for expansion into the soft-lens market, the licensee 
company would have to decide whether it would be profitable to ex-
pand into the market. This decision would be distorted by the initial 
total-sales royalty provision: the added variable cost of the royalty 
on the soft lens to the hard-lens patentee must reduce the profit mar-
gin obtainable from the sale of soft lenses and must thereby artifi-
cially deter the licensee from entering the new market segment. 132 
Id. at 73. (The above discussion assumes linear (straight-line) relationships. It assumes, for 
example, that variable costs and sales price do not change as units sold increase.) 
129. The amount of this added variable cost will depend upon the type of total-sales roy-
alty employed. The "percentage" royalty, for example, is calculated by applying a percentage 
rate to the licensee's total dollar sales of a specified product, while the "flat-rate" royalty is 
calculated by multiplying the number of units of the product sold by a specified flat-rate in 
dollars. See note 7 supra. 
The variable costs added by adoption of a flat-rate royalty provision equals the flat rate 
paid on the sale of each unit sold. This type of royalty will affect the licensee's break-even 
point as follows: 
If: Q = quantity of product covered by the total-sales royalty needed to be 
sold to break even 
F = fixed costs 
S = sales price per unit 
V = variable costs per unit (excluding royalties) 
Rf = flat-rate royalty per unit 
Then: Q - F 
- S - (V + Rf) 
Under a percentage total-sales royalty, the added variable cost will equal the percentage rate 
times the sales price of one unit. This kind of royalty will affect the licensee's break-even point 
as follows: 
If: Q = quantity of product covered by the total-sales royalty needed to be 
sold to break even 
F = fixed costs 
S = sales price per unit 
V = variable costs per unit (excluding royalties) 
Rp = percentage total-sales royalty 
Then: Q = s - [V :(Rp • S)) 
Under a percentage total-sales royalty, any price increase will also lead to increased royalties. 
130. See text at note 112 supra. 
131. See note 7 supra. 
132. The effect of the total-sales royalty upon a decision to enter a new product market 
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Where entry into the new market segment offers a relatively low 
profit margin the added variable cost of each end product in the new 
segment must often so reduce the licensee's profit margin that entry 
is economically infeasible. 133 In short, the total-sales royalty will re-
strain competition in markets not dependent upon the teaching of 
segment can be illustrated by the following example. First, note that, as is discussed in note 
129 supra, the break-even points using a flat-rate (Rf) and percentage (Rp) total-sales royalty 
are as follows: 
Flat-rate: Q - F 
- S-(V+RI) Percentage: Q - F - S-[V + (Rp • S)l 
Then suppose that a company projects sales of the new product segment of 10,000 units 
and assume that 
F = $10,000 
S = $5 
V = $3 
If, under a total-sales royalty provision the licensee is to pay a flat-rate royalty of$ I (Rf= I), 
then 
Q = 55 : 0<~ I) = 10,000 units 
This means that at a projected sales level of 10,000 units the company will just break even. 
Accordingly, the licensee will not enter the new market. Moreover, since some minimum rate 
of return will probably be required by the company, it is unlikely that the licensee will enter 
the market even if sales are projected slightly in excess of 10,000. 
In contrast, if the licensee is obligated to pay royahies solely on products which use the 
patent's teaching, then the licensee need not pay the royalty Rf and the break-even quantity 
can be determined as follows: 
Q = IO,OOO = 5 000 Units 
$5-$3' 
Thus, in the absence of a total-sales royalty provision the company need sell only 5,000 units 
of the product in order to break even. If, as we have assumed, the profit margin on each unit 
sold is $2, and if a total of 10,000 units are sold, the company's estimated net profits arising 
from entry will be $10,000. Since this appears to be an excellent return, it is likely that the 
licensee would enter the new product segment. 
It should be noted that the same outcome would have been reached if the licensee paid a 
percentage total-sales royalty of 20% (Rp = 20%). As is the case under a flat-rate royalty 
provision, a projected sales level of 10,000 units will mean that the licensee will just break 
even. 
10,000 
Q ~ $5 - ($3 + (.20 X $5)] = IO,OOO 
The break-even point of a royalty based solely on patent use, of course, will remain at 5,000 
units as described above. 
133. This can be illustrated by the following example. First, suppose that a licensee li-
censed a patent for a royalty of$10 on each end product sold (R = $10). Further, assume that 
the variable costs per unit equal $50 (V = $50) and that the sales price per unit equals $100 (S 
= $100). Thus, the licensee has a very attractive profit margin of $40: 
S - (V + R) = $100 - ($50 + $10) = $40 
Now suppose an opportunity arises for"~~ licensee to enter a new segment of the product 
market and assume that the licensee estimates that its variable costs per unit excluding royal-
ties will be $80 (V = $80) and that the sales price per unit will be $100 (S = $100). Since the 
licensee is bound by the earlier total-sales royalty provision, the licensee must pay royalties of 
$10 per end product sold even if the new end product makes no use of the patent. This means 
that the licensee's profit margin on sales of the new product will be only $10: 
S - (V + R) =_$100 - ($80 + $10) = $10 
Depending upon the fixed costs involved in ~ntering the new segment and depending on the 
..... 
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the patent. In contrast, had the licensee only been paying royalties 
on the use of the hard-lens patent, its decision would not have been 
distorted by the license and it would have been far likelier to enter 
the new market. 134 
The anticompetitive effects of a total-sales royalty are especially 
apparent where the patentee-licensor is competing with the licensee 
in the sale of the product covered by the total-sales royalty, since the 
patentee may employ a total-sales royalty provision to prevent the 
licensee from entering potential market segments. Although a licen-
see could delay entry into the new market until the license term ex-
pired, the delay might so firmly entrench the patentee in that market 
that it would be futile for the licensee, belatedly, to enter. 
Finally, the Zenith conditioning test cannot prevent these an-
ticompetitive effects. The licensee, unable to foresee future inven-
tions or anticipate which markets it may wish to enter, may consider 
a total-sales royalty provision an attractive proposal. A total-sales 
royalty which was freely bargained for and unprotested by the licen-
see may still ultimately restrain competition. 135 
IV. CONCLUSION 
This Note has argued that the Supreme Court has not understood 
the economic evils associated with total-sales royalty provisions. In 
Automatic Radio, the Court condemned tie-in practices because they 
projected sales of the product, this profit margin may or may not be sufficient to justify entry 
into the new segment. 
In contrast, if the original patent had been licensed with royalties payable only upon use of 
the patent's teaching, then the profit margin on the new segment would be 
S - V = $100 - $ 80 = $20 
Accordingly, the licensee would be far more likely to enter the new market. 
Finally, to the extent entry into the new segment requires the licensee to license additional 
patents and pay additional royalties, the likelihood that entry will be profitable is further re-
duced. 
134. See note 132 supra. 
135. See also Glen Mfg. Inc. v. Perfect Fit Indus., Inc., 299 F. Supp. 278 (S.D.N.Y. 1969), 
o/(d., 420 F.2d 319 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 397 U.S. 1042 (1970), where the court, prior to the 
Zenith decision, recognized that a total-sales royalty provision could reduce competition. The 
court stated: "This royalty structure has the effect of raising the cost of non-patented, compet-
ing toilet tank covers, thereby restraining their output and tending to lessen competition in the 
toilet tank cover industry." 299 F. Supp. at 282. The case was appealed. Subsequent holdings 
are discussed at notes 95-99 supra. On remand, the district court held that the license agree-
ments unreasonably lessened competition in the toilet tank cover industry. 324 F. Supp. I 133, 
I 137 (S.D.N.Y. 1971). 
Since the purpose of the patent laws is not "the creation of private fortunes," see note 20 
supra, total-sales royalties are subject to a further objection. Even if the variable costs at-
tached to any new or improved products covered by the royalty are not great enough to dis-
courage. entry into a new market, the patentee will garner profits that are not properly 
attributable to its inventive efforts. This will certainly be true whether or not the provision is 
insisted upon by the patentee. · 
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restrain competition in unpatented goods, but it failed to recognize 
that total-sales royalties also have anticompetitive effects. A licen-
see's inability under a total-sales royalty provision to avoid royalty 
costs by substituting a new patent discourages invention. Further-
more, the licensee's inability to escape royalty costs when entering a 
new market segment discourages licensees from entering new mar-
kets. 
Zenith does not resolve these difficulties. It suggests but does not 
demonstrate that the undesirable effects of total-sales royalties are 
avoided if the royalty is not a product of conditioning. This Note 
has argued that the fact that the provision is mutually convenient or 
freely bargained for does not vitiate the economic evils inherent in 
total-sales royalties. 
The courts, then, should condemn all total-sales royalties as pat-
ent misuse. This rule would eliminate the uncertainties caused by 
the conditioning test and would further the policies of both the pat-
ent grant and the antitrust laws. 
